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TORTURE IN DREAMLAND: DISPOSING OF THE TICKING BOMB

Henry Shue t
"Nothing has changed. The body still trembles as it trembled before
Rome was founded and after, in the twentieth century before and after
Christ. Tortures are just what they were, only the earth has shrunk
and whatever goes on sounds as if it's just a room away."

Torture is wrong.2 But sometimes we feel justified in doing what
we know is wrong because the stakes are so very high. So the next question
is: is torture so wrong that it is inexcusable no matter how high the stakes
are'? I will argue that all actual arrangements for torture are inexcusable, in
spite of the fact that we can imagine hypothetical cases, like the notorious
ticking-bomb cases in which it seems excusable. 3 Why are imaginary
examples like ticking-bomb hypotheticals so badly misleading about how to
plan for real cases? They mislead in two different ways that compound the
error: idealization and abstraction. 4 Idealization is the addition of positive
features to an example in order to make the example better than reality,
which lacks those features. Abstraction is the deletion of negative features
of reality from an example in order to make the example still better than
reality. Idealization adds sparkle, abstraction removes dirt. Together they
make the hypothetical superior to reality and thereby a disastrously
misleading analogy from which to derive conclusions about reality.
The advocates of torture love a ticking bomb. But even the honest
and thoughtful are mesmerized and bedeviled by the ticking-bomb hypot Henry Shue is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford. He is
grateful to intense audiences at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cornell
University, Dickinson College, Princeton University, University of Dayton, and University
of Oxford for valuable reactions to various formulations of these views and to Robert K.
Fullinwider for a quarter-century of discussion of the fundamental methodological issue,
often soothed by Bluegrass. The final judgments here on the relative weights of the competing considerations are of course his responsibility.
1

WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA, Tortures, in WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA, VIEW WITH A GRAIN OF

SAND: SELECTED POEMS 151 (Stanislaw Baranczak & Clare Cavanagh trans., 1995).
2 David Sussman provides a powerful explanation of why torture is wrong in his article in
this volume. David Sussman, Defining Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (2006).
3 David Luban, Torture, American-Style: This Debate Comes Down to Words vs. Deeds,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005, at B 1 (illustrating what a serious distraction from reality ticking-bomb cases are in the current U.S. debates).
4 My account of these two intellectual processes is roughly derived from Onora O'Neill,
EthicalReasoning and IdeologicalPluralism,98 ETHICS 705, 711-12 (1988).
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thetical, with its suggestion of a catastrophic outcome avoidable only
through torture. In a recent article Oren Gross writes:
The foregoing discussion still leaves us with the question of what constitutes a truly "catastrophic case." I will attempt to answer this question,
which clearly is significant to the overall tenability of my project, on a different occasion. For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge that some catastrophic case is possible.
Two paragraphs earlier Gross has quoted Carl Schmitt, who declared in Germany in 1922, "For a legal order to make sense, a normal
situation must exist;",6 then concluded: "General norms are limited in their
scope of application to those circumstances in which the normal state of
affairs prevails. Catastrophes undermine this factual basis." 7
Now, one problem is the easy assumption that no catastrophes occur
in normal times. This is one of many reasons it is not true that "it is sufficient to acknowledge that some catastrophic case is possible."8 We need to
know a great deal about a specific catastrophe, especially one that has not
actually happened yet, in order to determine whether it is evidence that
times are not normal to such a degree that legal order does not make sense.
But there are deeper problems here than circular definitions of 'normal' and
'catastrophe.'
Gross is sometimes flattering about my 1978 article, Torture,9 but
what he says about possible catastrophes possibly avoided by torture suggests that my fundamental methodological point concerning how to think
about torture has not come across. 10 This emboldens me to repeat myself,
attempting to be more lucid about argumentative methodology. I will not
rehearse all the perfections built into the artificial case."1 But note a few of
the respects in which the standard hypothetical departs from reality through
idealization.

5 Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 229, 239 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
6 Id. (quoting CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 13 (George Schwab trans., 1985).
7

id.

8

Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official

Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1487 n.26 (2004).
9 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).
10

See id.

"

See id. at 141-42.
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IDEALIZATION

The right man. The ticking bomb hypothetical is supposed to be the
case in which the disaster that torture might prevent is so catastrophic that
only the naive and the utopian would dream of choosing not to torture the
person who is somehow known with certainty actually to be the person who
planted the ticking bomb. He is not a suspected terrorist; it is built into the
hypothetical that he is a terrorist-indeed,the terrorist-thus eliminating
messy aspects of reality like uncertainty and probability. It is not that Central Intelligence Agency has kidnapped 100 people, some of whose names
sound like the name of the bomber, which, luckily, they somehow happen to
know. It is not that agents have arrested a Navajo who, they thought,
"looked like an Arab."
Prompt and accurate disclosure. The torture victim talks in a timely
and accurate fashion-he quickly divulges the crucial information before
the bomb has had time to explode. He does not have a heart attack and pass
out; he does not vomit on himself and have a psychotic break; he does not
tell a plausible diversionary lie that wastes the time available.
Rare, isolated case. "Most important, such incidents [of torture] do
not continue to happen."' 2 Once the original 'right man' becomes too
hysterical to provide coherent information, the torturers do not simply move
on to, as it were, the second-best 'right man.' And the torturers do not,
operating on the principle that practice makes perfect, circulate from, say,
Guantanamo to Bagram to Abu Ghraib to Romania to Poland.
Implicit in Torture were two different methodological theses that I
did not explicitly separate. The weaker thesis was: do not base general policy on exceptional cases-roughly, hard cases make bad law. The stronger
thesis was: do not base any institutional preparations on imaginary cases.13
Having quoted my proposed dictum, "artificial cases make bad ethics,"'
Gross argues as follows:
[I]ts problem lies in the fact that ticking bomb cases are not "artificial."
They are real, albeit rare. Ignoring them completely, by rhetorically
relegating them to the level of "artificial," is utopian or naive, at best.
There is a difference between ignoring completely the truly catastrophic
cases and focusing our attention elsewhere when designing general rules
and policies. 14
Because he earlier writes that we "must be mindful of the risk of
creating bad law (and ethics) to answer to the particular needs of the hard
12 Id. at 142.
13

Gross, supra note 5, at 234 (quoting Henry Shue, Torture, 7

(1978)).
14

Id.at 234.
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case,"" 5 I take it that Gross and I agree on the weaker thesis: do not base
general policy on exceptional cases. But we disagree about the stronger
thesis. We disagree about what else besides general policy, if anything, to
base on the alleged exceptional case.
In part thanks to Gross' critique the multiple reasons why tickingbomb hypotheticals seem "artificial" are clearer to me now. One reason is
that they are idealized. They are not simply imaginary but unrealistic, like
an imaginary alcoholic who drinks two beers only a night. There are former
alcoholics, who do not drink at all, and active alcoholics. To think that there
may be rare alcoholics who drink moderately is to fail to understand alcoholism. Similarly, history does not present us with a government that used
torture selectively and judiciously. 16 Are we to believe that America is
likely to be the first alcoholic in history who can take only one drink? The
first state apparatus that will use torture judiciously and selectively? Are
American politicians so superior to mere mortals?
Gross is confident that what he calls "catastrophic cases" are "real,
albeit rare." 17 If catastrophic cases had only the one feature of involving
extremely high stakes in human life, yes, catastrophic cases would be "real,
albeit rare"-perhaps not even so rare. But the high stakes are the only
realistic feature in the ticking-bomb hypothetical. Its other features are all
too good to be true, especially to be true in conjunction: the right man and
the prompt right result and the judicious decision to refrain from all further
torture until the next genuine catastrophe almost certainly looms. This
happy conjunction is not rare-it is virtually impossible given the kind of
people who rise to the top in politics. What would be "utopian or naive"
would be to believe that the kind of people who are running the so-called
"War on Terrorism" would, if they had discretion about using torture in
secret-against "ghost detainees" in "black sites," say- choose to restrain
themselves in spite of the impossibility of accountability.
The Alice-in-Wonderland character of the assumption that the use
of torture will not be widespread throws into doubt the location of the catastrophe. Gross, along with most people who appeal to the ticking-bomb hypothetical, take it to be beyond dispute that the catastrophe lies on the side
of not torturing: we are too squeamish to torture the terrorist who planted
the bomb, and the bomb explodes, bringing the catastrophe of death and
destruction. One other possibility is that catastrophe lies on the side of undermining the taboo against torture. Then other nations will reason that if
the superpower with its thousands of nuclear weapons and high-tech conventional forces cannot maintain its own security without the liberal use of
15 Id.

16 If anyone knows a case, I would appreciate an e-mail giving its name.
17

Gross, supra note 5, at 234.
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secret torture, they can hardly be expected to defend their security without
far more torture. And what currently passes for civilization may then slide
backward in the general direction of the eighth century. That too would be a
catastrophe, a civilizational catastrophe. I am not predicting a full return of
barbarism. Yet it is clear that idealizations that cause the epidemic nature of
torture to evaporate from view are no guide for practical action. My honest
judgment is that stories that are too good to be true are not true rarely, but
false. The ticking-bomb hypothetical is too good to be true-it is torture
conducted by wise, self-restrained angels.
But what if I am mistaken in doubting that the perfect time for torture will arrive. I am certainly not appealing to conceptual necessities, but
instead making empirical judgments about the nature of human beings and
the effects of power without accountability, secret torture hidden from the
citizens in whose name it is inflicted. What if I have the facts wrong?
Ironically, here Gross and I-at least as I reasoned in 1978-share a
common problem. I think the exceptional case is probably in fact impossible, especially the feature stipulating that the torture does not metastasize
throughout the body politic. Gross thinks the exceptional case is rare but
clearly practically possible. Neither of us claims to have ruled it out. If it
comes, what do we recommend? Here is where the unreality of abstraction,
as distinguished from idealization, haunts us both.
ABSTRACTION

Gross and I both think, it seems, that torture should remain, as it is,
absolutely non-derogably illegal. But we both also wished that if a public
official honestly, upon careful reflection, judged that the ultimate catastrophe loomed but that it could be prevented if and only if some one personor even some small number of persons-were tortured, he could act on his
conviction and conduct the torture outside the law. I say "outside the law"
in order to fudge some differences between us that, although they are important, I do not want to pursue very far here. As his comments regarding the
quotation from Carl Schmitt that I introduced at the beginning of this piece
indicate, Gross believes that the arrival of what he calls the "catastrophic
case" heralds, or perhaps simply constitutes, the suspension of normality
that, Schmitt claimed, is a necessary condition for the rule of law. Schmitt
seems to me to have matters backwards. It is when conditions are eroding
that one really needs the rule of law. But that is a long story for another
time.
Gross characterizes the non-normal situation as "extra-legal,'
which is worrisome because it seems much too wholesale. To be fair to him,
however, he insists that any entry into the extra-legal be considered for "ex
18

Id. at 240.
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post ratification."' 19 In his hypothetical, if the move to the extra-legal is not
granted ex post ratification, then any official who ordered torture as an act
of "official disobedience" may be punished criminally and sued civilly for
violating the laws against torture. 20 My 1978 proposal was much more limited and simple: essentially, that the torture would be like an act of civil
disobedience at least in the respect that the conscientious torturer would
willingly submit to charges and trial. If the torture had demonstrably prevented the end of the world, the charges would presumably be dropped or
the sentence suspended.
The difficulty, which seems equally severe for Gross's suggestion
and mine, is that our reluctant torturer would probably also be an incompetent torturer, most unlikely to succeed at what might well be his first try at
extracting information. Successful torturers must avoid sympathy and empathy, or they will go too easy. But they must also avoid anger and cruelty, or
they will go too hard and merely knock the victim senseless, or drive him
into a dissociative state, and learn nothing useful for the prevention of catastrophe. Torture is not for amateurs-successful torturers need to be real
"pros", and no one becomes a "pro" overnight. At a minimum, one must
practice-perhaps do research, be mentored by the still more experienced.
In short, torture needs a bureaucracy, with apprentices and experts, of the
Torquemada was not an independent
kind that torture in fact always has.
21
consultant. Torture is an institution.
Arrigo sums it up this way:
The use of sophisticated torture techniques by a trained staff entails the
problematic institutional arrangements I have laid out: physician assistance; cutting edge, secret biomedical research for torture techniques unknown to the terrorist organization and tailored to the individual captive
for swift effect; well trained torturers, quickly accessible at major locations; pre-arranged permission from the courts because of the urgency; rejection of independent monitoring due to security issues; and so on. These
institutional arrangements will have to be in place, with all their unintended and accumulating consequences, however rarely terrorist suspects
[T]he harm to innocent victims of the terrorist should be
are tortured ....

19

Id. at 242.

20

Id. at 240-41. I do not entirely follow this reasoning. If the situation is extra-legal, the

law has presumably been suspended; consequently it is difficult to see what violation the
official could fairly be punished for. Nevertheless, I am glad the torturer will be punished if
he gets it wrong.
21 See Jean Maria Arrigo, A UtilitarianArgument Against Torture Interrogationof Terrorists, 10 SCIENCE & ENGINEERING ETHICS 543 (2004) (portraying a realistic account of the
practical prerequisites of torture based on serious research). See also Jessica Wolfendale,
Training Torturers: A Critique of the 'Ticking Bomb' Argument, in 32 SOCIAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE (forthcoming 2006) (providing complementary arguments to a similar conclusion).
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weighed against the breakdown of22 key social institutions and statesponsored torture of many innocents.
Now this actually further buttresses the earlier point about idealization: it is simply dreamy to think that all of a sudden we are simply going to
stumble upon someone who happens to have the skills to make a man who
planted a ticking bomb reverse the direction of his life and assist us in defusing his bomb. But this is very bad news for my attempt in 1978 and
Gross's attempt now to allow the exceptional case. Our common problem is
abstraction: we have abstracted from the social basis-the institutional context-necessary for the practice of torture. For torture is a practice. Practitioners who do not practice will not be very good at what they do. Who are
we imagining that they will practice on? Practitioners without the best
equipment will also not be very good. Where will they obtain their "cutting
edge" equipment? 23 How will they test it in order to be sure it will work
when the catastrophe looms?
Either "torturers" are just thugs who have no clue what they are
doing, in which case we need not allow for exceptional cases in which they
rapidly and effectively
extract invaluable
catastrophe-preventing
information, or some can have genuine expertise. Arrigo cites one of her
U.S. informants: "The Air Force interrogator said he tried to interview
terrorist suspects 'before any heavy-handed ex-Turkish farmer slapped them
around.' 24 If expertise is available, we would certainly want it at hand in
the exceptional, potentially catastrophic case. If we want it ready, we need
to maintain, even nourish, the organizations and networks in which the
expertise resides.
Here, then, is the really bad news. The moderate position on torture
is an impractical abstraction-it is torture in dreamland. The only operationally feasible positions are toward the extremes. Gross and I (in 1978)doubtless because we are moderate and reasonable people-have been trying to have it both ways. 25 I-and I leave Professor Gross to speak for him22

Id. at 564 (emphasis added). See Michael Hanna et al., The War on Medical Morality

(forthcoming) (discussing the corrupting effects on the medical profession of physician assistance).
23
Id. at 552 (noting that the United States is "the largest international supplier of electroshock weapons--stun guns, electro-shock batons, and the like--to governments that practice
electro-shock torture") (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STOPPING THE TORTURE TRADE 34
(2001)). This is of course the crude stuff.
24

Id.at 549 (withholding the identity of the Air Force interrogator).

25

Where violence and brutality seem necessary in a good cause, this is a constant, but

often fatal, attraction. See Henry Shue, Having It Both Ways: The Gradual Wrong Turn in
American Strategy, in NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND MORAL RESTRAINT: CRITICAL CHOICES

FOR AMERICAN STRATEGY 13 (Henry Shue ed., 1989) (presenting an analogous problem

concerning nuclear weapons).
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self-was like the recovering alcoholic dreaming of avoiding the extreme of
total abstinence through the 'moderate' strategy of only a drink or two a
night. That is not an option, and the alcoholic has only the extremes between which to choose. In the quarter-century since 1978 we have also
learned that there is no moderate position on torture either. Torture is now
rampant, and high-officials in the U.S. government are its poster-children.
You cannot be a little bit pregnant, you cannot-if you are an alcoholichave a drink only on special occasions, and you cannot-if your politicians
are not angels-employ torture only on special occasions.
Michael Ignatieff, another reasonable and moderate person, hopes
like Gross and me to have it both ways: "[A]n outright ban on torture
creates the problem of the conscientious offender. This is a small price to
pay for a ban on torture., 26 If the conscientious offender is to be an effective
and competent torturer, or to have them on call, he must, because of the
cascading corruption of key social institutions, like medicine and the courts,
that Arrigo suggests, be the tip of a bureaucratic iceberg of institutionalized
torture, an iceberg that will probably be replicated nation by nation around
the world-not such a small price in fact. To try to leave a constrained
loophole for the competent "conscientious offender" is in fact to leave an
expanding loophole for a bureaucracy of routinized torture, as I misguidedly
did in the 1978 article. What is truly "utopian or naive" is trusting the state
and its subservient lawyers not to exploit every loophole zealously, a lesson
we should have learned from Orwell's 1984. The textbook for our remedial
course is The Torture Papers.2 7 One can imagine rare torture, but one
cannot institutionalize rare torture. The suggestion of rare torture has no
place in the real world of politics. It is an optimistic thought with no social
embodiment.
As David Luban recently put it:
The real torture debate, therefore, isn't about whether to throw out the
rulebook in the exceptional emergencies. Rather, it's about what the rulebook says about the ordinary interrogation ....[Senator] McCain has said
that ultimately the debate is over who we are. We will never figure that out
until we28stop talking about ticking bombs, and stop playing games with
words."
So I now take the most moderate position on torture, the position
nearest to the middle of the road, feasible in the real world: never again.
Never, ever, exactly as international law indisputably requires. If the perfect
26

Michael Ignatieff, Moral Prohibitionat A Price, in TORTURE: DOES IT MAKE US SAFER?

IS IT EVER OK? 25 (Kenneth Roth et al. eds., 2005).
27

THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GIRmAI

Dratel eds., 2005).
28 Luban, supra note 3.

(Karen J.Greenberg and Joshua L.
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time for torture comes, and we are not prepared to prevent a terroristic catastrophe, we will at least know that we have not sold our souls and we have
not brutalized the civilization. These are catastrophes we actually can avoid.
Some of us may, or may not, as a result of our refusal to tolerate secret torture bureaucracies and their gulags, die in some other catastrophe, but civilized principles will survive for members of future generations, who may be
grateful for our sacrifice so that they could lead decent lives. About this
price Ignatieff is correct: "Those of us who oppose torture should also be
honest enough to admit that we may have to pay a price for our own convictions. Ex ante, of course, I cannot tell how high this price might be .... This
is a risk I am prepared to take ...., Meanwhile, our taxes fund secret
detention centers into which people disappear but in which, we are assured
on highest authority, in spite of a total lack of accountability no torture ever
occurs.

29

Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 27.

